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ABSTRACT 
 
Time for a change? Brain activity and behavioral performance reveal different dynamics 
at short, intermediate, and long delay intervals during a delay discounting task 
 
Conrad Mohr-Eymer 
 
Director: Dr. Lee Baugh, Ph.D. 
 
 
In our day to day lives, the ability to make goal-oriented decisions plays a crucial 
role in both our work and social lives.  Therefore, researchers have examined how factors 
such as a varying reward or delay may affect decision making.  One’s performance when 
making intertemporal choices, decisions made between a smaller and sooner (SS) reward 
and a larger and later (LL) reward, are often examined to study these factors.  Although 
time and reward magnitude are important dimensions when individuals make decisions 
during delay discounting, little is known about the relationship between time perception, 
reward magnitude, and underlying neural mechanisms.  To address this gap in literature, 
participants completed a modified delay discounting task during fMRI with stimuli that 
included fluctuating reward and delay values.  An exploratory factor analysis using 
behavioral data identified three categories of delays and reward values that were used to 
create brain contrasts.  In these comparisons, the middle frontal gyrus and cingulate gyrus 
seemed to be more involved when choosing rewards of greater magnitude while the 
medial frontal gyrus and insula were found to be more active for longer delays.  Our 
results suggest that delay and reward determination are handled by separate neural 
networks.          
KEYWORDS: intertemporal choice, fMRI, time perception, reward magnitude 
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Time for a change? Brain activity and behavioral performance reveal different dynamics 
at short, intermediate, and long delay intervals during a delay discounting task 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Each day, individuals are tasked with making a variety of different decisions.  These 
choices range from low caliber decisions such as what to have for breakfast to more life 
changing ones like buying a house.  To make these selections, humans are constantly 
weighing the pros and cons of each outcome.  Living in a society with rules and 
regulations, the ability to properly make goal-orientated choices is important in forming 
productive relationships with others, holding down a job, and having the money to 
purchase the goods needed to survive.  Since proper decision-making is a key trait in 
one’s life, much research has been done looking at the different factors that affect one’s 
capacity to choose.  Impulsivity is one such factor that asserts its influence on an 
individual’s decision making ability in a number of different areas in their life including: 
financial planning (Banks et al., 1998); (Thompson et al., 1983), choice of diet (Shapiro, 
2005), sexual risk-taking (Clift et al., 1993), and even political policy making (Berns et 
al., 2007).  Properly understanding the hold that impulsivity has over a person’s decision 
making becomes more relevant considering the high level of impulse control deficiencies 
in numerous pathological conditions such as borderline and antisocial personality 
disorders (Stein et al., 1993); (Stein et al., 1995), as well as the general likelihood of 
engaging in criminal behavior (Eysenck & McGurk, 1980).  In these situations, 
impulsivity influences one’s process for making intertemporal choices.  Intertemporal 
choices involve an individual choosing between a smaller and sooner (SS) reward or a 
later and larger (LL) reward (Frederick et al., 2002).  To examine intertemporal choice, a 
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delay discounting paradigm is often utilized.  People are said to display delay discounting 
behavior when they repeatedly show a propensity for an SS reward to an LL reward when 
making an intertemporal choice.  This research will examine intertemporal choice using 
fMRI and a novel delay discounting task to provide a more in-depth map of how 
intertemporal decisions activate the brain.   
1.1. Brain Activation During Intertemporal Choices  
Steep and excessive discounting has been exhibited in many problematic 
behaviors in both healthy populations and populations with self-control deficiencies 
(Ainslie, 1975); (Frederick et al., 2002).  Historically, intertemporal choices have been 
studied in the fields of economics and psychology.  Neuroscience is the most recent 
entrant into this interdisciplinary topic, bringing with it the possibility to see how 
intertemporal choices activate the brain.  To date, research generated by neuroscientists 
has been in the form of functional neuroimaging studies employing region-of-interest 
(ROI) analyses, which have identified different brain regions responsible for future-based 
LL choices and present-focused SS choices.  Specifically, the mesolimbic dopamine 
system has been associated with immediate rewards, while the lateral prefrontal regions 
and the posterior parietal cortex are shown to respond to future rewards (McClure et al., 
2007).  
These findings have been used to support the creation of a two-component model 
of intertemporal choice.  In this model, one system is said to control the weighing of 
rewards offered in an immediate time frame (known as the beta system), while the other 
is said to weigh rewards offered at all delays (the delta system; (Laibson, 1997)).  These 
studies helped to establish a basis for understanding how intertemporal choices occur; 
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however, they were confronted by findings from Kable and Glimcher (2007) that 
exhibited activation of the mesolimbic projection regions (nucleus accumbens and medial 
prefrontal cortex) in correlation to a combination of the magnitude and delay of a reward.  
Their conclusion from these results was that only a single system in the brain is involved 
in making intertemporal choices, and it responds to a combination of magnitude and 
delay information to hyperbolically discount future rewards.  In an effort to make sense 
of these contrasting results, Ballard and Knutson (2009) created a novel delay 
discounting task that they hoped would allow them to determine if independent neuronal 
substrates would activate in response to the magnitude and delay of a reward before a 
final choice was made.  Their results showed that the nucleus accumbens was sensitive to 
magnitude information and the lateral cortical regions were sensitive to delay 
information.  In turn, these findings provided initial evidence pointing to these constructs 
resulting from separate neural pathways.  
 With delay and reward magnitude hypothesized to enlist different neuronal 
pathways when making intertemporal choices, further research has been done to 
determine how one’s perception of time and reward value may factor into these 
differences.  One insight for this line of inquiry comes from previous studies that have 
suggested an altered sense of time as the cause for the steep discounting behavior 
observed in more impulsive individuals (i.e. an altered perception of delay) (Barkley et 
al., 2001); (Barratt, 1983); (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004).  Another insight comes from 
knowledge on how individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds may perceive 
the value of a monetary reward.  
1.2. Modeling Intertemporal Choices 
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 Looking back on the research done in the fields of psychology and economics, a 
large part of their literature has involved modeling intertemporal choices using a 
functional model.  These value functions often derive from monetary intertemporal 
choice data and are typically expressed in terms of a discounting curve over time.  Two 
generally accepted models predominate the literature and they are the exponential 
discounting model and the hyperbolic discounting model.  Many studies have involved 
trying to fit discounting behavior in a variety of different conditions to one of these 
models (Green & Myerson, 2004); (Kirby & Maraković, 1995); (Loewenstein & Thaler, 
1989); (Mazur, 1987). The exponential model is calculated as  
𝑽 = 𝑨𝒆−𝒌𝑫 
where V signifies the present value of the delayed reward (otherwise known as the 
indifference point), A is the amount of the delayed reward, D is the delay, and k is the 
discounting rate parameter.  However, this model has often seen pushback due to the 
inconsistencies in its ability to represent discounting behavior in animal (Ainslie, 1975) 
and human (Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995) research.  For example, individuals may prefer an 
SS reward when immediately offered the choice; yet, when delaying the outcome of both 
rewards equally, subjects will switch their preference to the LL reward (Kirby & 
Herrnstein, 1995).  To better account for these irregularities, a hyperbolic model, such as 
the following, has been suggested (Mazur, 1987): 
𝑽 = 𝑨/(𝟏 + 𝒌𝑫) 
Hyperbolic functions describe a discounting pattern that is steeper at short delays than 
long delays and in this manner is better able to reflect observed behavioral data in most 
scenarios.  The different curvature seen in this hyperbolic function over time echoes 
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results seen in the fMRI study done by McClure et al. (2004) that demonstrated a more 
impulsive beta system in charge of SS decisions and a more patient delta system that 
handles LL choices.    
More recent findings (Figner et al., 2010) suggest that although individuals often 
prefer SS options, LL choices will still get chosen in some cases due to the activation of a 
self-control mechanism that is controlled by the left Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (lLPFC). 
This view states that the lLPFC is not just a part of the more patient delta system that has 
been presented in research; rather, it is an independent neuro-substrate in regulating 
intertemporal choice.  This finding has led us to conduct this research, as we believe that 
in cases of rewards involving exceedingly long delays (e.g. numerous years), the delta 
system may be restricted by reaching its cognitive and computational limit.  As a result, 
the lLPFC (and possibly other brain areas) may play a bigger role for choosing LL 
options.   
The above converging behavioral and neuroimaging findings suggest that a 
unitary discounting function may not be a psychological reality.  In this study, we 
propose a Tri-phasic Delay Discounting hypothesis that suggests delay discounting as a 
function of temporal distance consists of three phases: (1) initial and short delays from 
the present time to hours or days in the future, (2) foreseeable and tractable delays of 
weeks to a few years, and (3) distal long delays of more than multiple years.  The third 
component of this novel hypothesis (diminished sensitivity), which is not included in the 
two system hypothesis proposed by McClure et al. (2004), accounts for the flattened 
portion of delay discounting associated with distant and long delays and is expected to be 
a result of cognitive limitation (see Figure 1).  For example, cognitive limitation is often 
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evident in the average person’s inability to properly compute compound interest.  
Another goal of this research is to use our novel delay discounting task to take what is 
already expressed in the literature about delay and reward magnitude and determine if we 
are able to see different neuronal activation regions using reward and delay magnitude as 
variables.  While it has been found that varying the reward and delay, as well as one’s 
perception of this variation, may result in differential activation, little is still known about 
how these systems work together to form a complete network when making intertemporal 
choices.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized delay discounting curve. Our hypothesis predicts a tri-phasic 
delay discounting curve, with a hyperbolic function best representing the initial 
discounting rate, but an exponential function fitting the latter time points.  
 
2. Hypotheses and Predictions 
2.1. Behavioral Hypothesis 
The current study will examine how what has previously been learned about delay 
discounting tasks extends into time scales previously unexplored.  Behaviorally, we 
envision that participants will perform congruently to other studies when it comes to 
intertemporal choices that involve an earlier time base, demonstrating behavior that can 
be best modeled by a hyperbolic discounting curve.  Following our novel tri-phasic 
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discounting hypothesis, we envision that when the temporal delay becomes much later, 
behavior will start to follow more of an exponential form due to individuals reaching 
their computational limits when it comes to judging value.  
2.2 Neuroimaging Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2a. We propose that different areas of brain activation will be involved when 
choosing LL opposed to SS rewards.  Numerous fMRI delay discounting studies have 
been conducted in the past demonstrating this effect and we can use these studies to 
confirm that similar areas are active for our delay discounting using novel stimuli.  From 
previous studies, LL decisions are expected to be associated with higher activation of the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) (Cohen et al., 2011);(Sellitto et al., 2010);(Sellitto et 
al., 2011) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (Hutcherson et al., 2012).  
Prefrontal cortex regions play a large role in executive control and delaying gratification, 
which support these findings.  Additionally, it has been predicted that the posterior 
cingulate gyrus is involved with choosing larger rewards throughout all time intervals 
(Wittmann & Paulus, 2008); therefore, this region should be active when contrasting 
between small versus large rewards, but not between different delay periods. Another 
probable area of activation is the insula.  Previous results have shown insular activation 
in decision making studies on risk-taking (Ernst et al., 2002) and anticipation of rewards 
(Critchley et al., 2001). Wittmann and Paulus (2008) recorded findings that suggest 
specific activation in the posterior part of the insula during LL rewards while 
ventroanterior parts of the insula and striatum are more active during SS reward selection.  
For SS decisions, activation is expected in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 
(Hare et al., 2009).   
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Hypothesis 2b.  Our novel Tri-Phasic Delay Discounting Hypothesis predicts that 
behavioral results could best be predicted by a three-phase discounting function.  We 
hypothesize that each phase of this Triphasic function will also elicit neuronal activation 
in specific and separate brain areas.  To determine separate activation across different 
time clusters, our delay discounting task involved questions where the delay ranged from 
1 day to 20 years (see methods).  Once participant responses were collected, an 
exploratory factor analysis was used to collapse across reward value and identify any 
delay periods that clustered together (see methods).  Three distinct time periods were 
found and labeled short (days to months), intermediate (1, 2, and 5 years), and long (10 or 
20 years).  We hypothesize that brain activation patterns over the three time periods, 
which would correspond to the three phases in our proposed function, are distinguishable.  
Predicted activation from responses to questions in the short time period should involve 
reward-pleasure related brain areas such as ventral striatum and medial forebrain 
structures, including insula, caudate, putamen, and medial prefrontal cortex (Knutson, 
Fong, et al., 2001); (Knutson et al., 2000).  Intermediate time period activation is likely to 
be observed in the cognitive control areas such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPC) (McClure et al., 2007);(Essex et al., 2012).  Activation during long, extended 
delays is more difficult to determine with little previous research; therefore, non-specific 
higher cortical activations (Jaeggi et al., 2007) are predicted during this phase.  
Hypothesis 2c. The magnitude of the delayed reward is also expected to result in specific 
neuronal activation.  We predict that activity in the nucleus accumbens, medial prefrontal 
cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex will increase with the magnitude of reward as seen 
in previous work (Ballard & Knutson, 2009).  Some of these brain areas may be active as 
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a result of a combination of differing delays and magnitudes; however, the nucleus 
accumbens has been found to respond only to fluctuations in future reward magnitude.  
These regions align with current predictions that the mesolimbic circuits are responsible 
for encoding the magnitude of anticipated future rewards (Knutson, Adams, et al., 2001); 
(Knutson & Cooper, 2005).  By using a factor analysis, we are able to collapse across 
time delays to identify monetary amounts that cluster together based upon the 
participant’s perception.  These groups were labeled as small ($50), medium ($500, 
$5,000), and large ($500,000) monetary reward groups (see methods).  Identifying our 
groupings in this manner allows us to determine the assignment of each monetary reward 
amounts based upon participant responses rather than our perception of what qualifies as 
a small versus medium/large money reward. 
3. Method 
3.1 Participants 
Forty-three right-handed native English-speaking adults (28 females; mean age 
21.91 ± 5.16 age range 18 – 37 years of age) participated in this study.  Exclusion criteria 
included: (a) current pregnancy or lactation; (b) history of head injury or neurologic 
disorders; and (c) any contraindications to MRI based on a safety screening.  Participants 
provided written informed consent for a protocol approved by the Institutional Review 
Board of the University of South Dakota. 
3.2 Assessment Instruments and Tasks 
Participant interviews, scale administration, and delay discounting tasks first took 
place at an initial meeting, which was on a separate day from the fMRI study.  This 
allowed for a complete description of the fMRI study procedures, screening for 
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contraindications to MRI, and the collection of scale and delay discount task responses to 
establish stability in delay discount rate and scale responses over time; participants 
completed the same scales and delay discounting tasks during the fMRI study.  
Participants were administered a demographic questionnaire to assess age, gender, and 
handedness.  The Domain Specific Risk Taking Scale (DOSPERT-7); (Wang et al., 2016) 
was used to assess individual differences in both evolutionarily typical and modern risk 
taking propensity across seven domains, including cooperation/competition, safety, 
reproduction, natural/physical risk, financial risk, and gambling.  The Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale version 11 (BIS-11); (Patton et al., 1995), was used to assess the 
personality/behavioral construct of impulsiveness.  Participants also completed two 
versions of a delay discounting task.  
To encourage accurate realistic responses, delay discounting tasks were presented 
as a (simulated) sealed auction, a task adapted from Kirby and Maraković (1995) and 
Kirby and Santiesteban (2003).  In one version, participants were asked to bid the least 
amount of money they would be willing to accept today in exchange for receiving a 
delayed larger reward, without knowledge of the bids of the other participants.  In a 
second version of the sealed auction, participants were told to bid the most they would be 
willing to pay today in order to receive a larger reward after a delay.  These accept-today 
and pay-today procedural variations have been found to lead to no differences in discount 
rates generated (Kirby & Santiesteban, 2003).  Participants completed a total of 52 pay-
today and 51 accept-today trials, using four monetary rewards: $50; $500; $5,000; 
$500,000 and 13 time delays: 1 day, 2 days, 3 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 2 months, 
6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years.  Participants were instructed that 
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there would be one winner for each of the two delay discounting auction games, and that 
the winner would be the person who bid the true value of the delayed reward as 
determined by a formula.  For the delay discounting tasks, we used real monetary 
rewards—as opposed to hypothetical rewards—to encourage realistic responses and 
increase the generalizability of results (e.g. (Kirby & Maraković, 1995); (Xu et al., 
2016)).  To increase the external validity of the auction game, participants were asked to 
write their preferred mailing address on a blank envelope, which would be used to send 
their monetary reward should they win the auction.  Participants were not informed when 
the study would be complete, nor the value of the monetary reward in order to reduce 
bias associated with subjective costs associated with the delay or reward value.  Upon 
completion of the study, two participants were randomly selected as “winners” of the 
auction game and mailed a $25 money order.  Altogether, using a real monetary reward, a 
sealed bid auction, and two types of delay discounting trials discouraged underbidding or 
overbidding, minimized bias and the subjective cost associated with the delayed reward 
for winning, and encouraged realistic responses. 
3.2.1 Accept-Today Delay Discounting Task. The accept-today delay discounting 
task was structured so that the participant decided the amount of money they would need 
to forgo a smaller amount of money to be received today in order to receive a larger 
monetary reward in the future.  Instructions were presented on the screen as follows:  
“For the next series of questions, you will play an auction game against other participants 
of this study.  In the next task, you will be able to win a small amount of real money, 
based upon the auction results.  There will be approximately 32 participants in this study.  
All of you will participate in a sealed auction.  The winner of the auction will receive a 
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money reward sent by mail after the study is finished.  Therefore, you should choose your 
bids carefully.  The easiest way to decide how much to bid is to ask yourself what is the 
LEAST you would be willing to accept. In each choice task, you will indicate the LEAST 
amount of money that you would accept for a larger future reward by giving up the 
smaller present reward.” 
In exchange for $500 today, the LEAST return I would be willing to accept in 2 months 
is $_____________. 
3.2.2 Pay-Today Delay Discounting Task.  In contrast, the pay-today task asked 
participants to forego a larger monetary reward to be received after a delay in order to 
receive a smaller reward today.  These questions were also structured as an auction, with 
the following instructions: 
“For the next series of questions, you will play an auction game against other 
participants of this study.  In the next task, you will be able to win a small amount of real 
money, based upon the auction results.  There will be approximately 32 participants in 
this study.  All of you will participate in a sealed auction.  The winner of the auction will 
receive a money reward sent by mail after the study is finished.  Therefore, you should 
choose your bids carefully.  The best strategy is to bid exactly what the future reward is 
worth to you.   The easiest way to decide how much to bid is to ask yourself what is the 
MOST you would be willing to pay for the guaranteed future reward.  In each choice 
task, you will indicate the MOST amount of money that you would pay today in order to 
receive a larger future reward.” 
An example of a pay-today trial was:   
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In exchange for $500 in 2 months, the MOST I would be willing to pay is 
$____________ today. 
3.3 Procedure 
3.3.1 Initial Meeting. Following informed consent, participants completed a 
demographic questionnaire, MRI screening form, DOSPERT-7 scale, BIS-11 scale, and 
the 52 pay-today and 51 accept-today delay discounting trials administered with an online 
survey software tool, PsychData, and presented in counterbalanced order to control for 
order effects. Participants were reimbursed with either university course credit or $20 in 
cash on the day of the study.  The initial meeting took approximately 60 minutes.   
Participants who were interested in the fMRI study, and who were not excluded 
(see exclusion criteria), participated in the fMRI study.  This resulted in 33 (19 females; 
mean age 22.91 ± 5.51; age range 18 – 37 years of age) of the original 43 participants 
undergoing fMRI on average 16.39 ± 12.93 days (range 0 – 45 days) from the initial 
meeting. 
3.3.2 fMRI Testing Session. On the day of the fMRI study, participants again 
provided written informed consent, and were reimbursed $40 for their time and travel to 
the scanning location.  Participants completed the DOSPERT-7, BIS-11, and 51 pay-
today and 52 accept-today delay discounting trials while fMRI was performed.  Tasks 
were presented on a 30-inch LCD screen (Invivo, Gainesville, FL) that participants could 
view using a single reflection mirror box affixed to the head-coil.  Behavioral responses 
were collected with an MR-compatible button response box (Lumina LP-400, 
Corporation, San Pedro, CA), which was affixed to the participant’s wrist via a Velcro 
strap to ensure minimal movement during the study.  A graphic representing this set-up is 
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shown in Figure 2.  Stimulus presentation and data recording were accomplished using a 
dedicated PC running custom software (LabVIEW 2015; National Instruments, Austin, 
TX, USA). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. How participants were positioned in the scanner for our delay discounting task 
 
For the delay discounting tasks, the response box was programmed so that a 
button press corresponding to the right-hand index-finger (left button) decreased the 
amount displayed, while a button press with the right-hand middle finger (right button) 
increased the amount displayed.  The amount decreased and increased by a single button 
press was scaled at 1% of the value used in the trial.  For example, for delay discounting 
trials with $50, each button press increased or decreased the value by 50 cents; for trials 
with $500 a button press increased or decreased the value by $5; for trials with $5,000 a 
button press increased or decreased the value by $50; and for $500,000 trials a button 
press increased or decreased the value by $5,000.  Changes in response values were 
updated on the display with each button press.  Participants were given 14 seconds to 
respond, with the value at the end of this period serving as their trial response (Figure 3). 
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3.3.3 Image Acquisition and Pre-Processing. Conventional Blood Oxygen Level 
Dependent (BOLD) imaging techniques were used on a 3-Tesla whole-body Siemens 
Skyra scanner (Erlangen, Germany) and integrated 20–channel birdcage radio frequency 
coil.  Functional MRI volumes were collected using a T2*-weighted, single-shot, 
gradient-echo, echo-planar imaging acquisition sequence [TR: 2000 ms; TE: 30 ms; slice 
thickness: 4 mm; gap thickness: 0 mm; in-plane resolution: 3.4375 mm × 3.4375 mm; 
matrix size: 64 × 64 mm; FOV: 220 × 220 mm; flip angle: 90°].  Acquisition was angled 
along the plane of the anterior and posterior commissures.  We collected a total of 520 
volumes across three functional runs (180, 169, and 171 volumes) for the accept-today 
and the pay-today delay discounting tasks.  After functional imaging, a high resolution 
T1-weighted Magnetization Prepared Rapid Acquisition Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) was 
collected for each participant [TR: 1900 ms; TE: 2.13 ms; slice thickness: 0.9 mm; gap 
thickness: 0 mm; in-plane resolution: 0.9375 × 0.9375 mm; matrix size: 256 × 256 mm;  
FOV: 240 × 240 mm; flip angle: 9°].  
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Figure 3.  Timeline of one trial of the delay discounting tasks, which utilized an event-
related fMRI design with trial-onset asynchrony.  A. Accept-today delay discounting 
task.  B. Pay-today delay discounting task. Written instructions for the auction game were 
presented at the start of each functional run.  Responses were made with a button 
response device.  Each button press would increase or decrease the displayed underlined 
value by 1%. In this case, a left button press would decrease the underlined value by $5, 
while a right button press would increase the underlined value by $5 ($500 x .01 = $5). 
Participants completed 51 pay-today and 52 accept-today trials across 6 functional runs.  
Tasks were counterbalanced to control for order effects. T1-weighted images were taken 
at the completion of the delay discounting tasks.  N = 33 
 
BrainVoyager (Brainvoyager 20.6, Brain Innovations, Maastricht, the 
Netherlands) was used for all imaging analyses.  Functional data preprocessing steps 
included slice scan time correction, 3D motion correction, and temporal high pass 
filtering.  Slice scan time correction was performed using cubic spline interpolation based 
on information about the TR (2000 ms) and the order of the slice scanning (interleaved 
slice order).  3D motion correction (trilinear estimation and sinc resampling) was carried 
out to detect and correct small head movements by spatially aligning all volumes within a 
functional run to the first recorded volume (rigid body transformation).  A temporal high 
pass filter was used to remove frequencies lower than two cycles per time course.   
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Anatomical data underwent brain extraction and inhomogeneity correction.  Anatomical 
and functional data were spatially normalized to the Talairach coordinate system 
(Tournoux, 1988) with an intensity alignment using a multi-scale approach.  After 
registering the functional and anatomical data, spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel 
with a full-width at half maximum (FWHM) of 8 mm was also performed.  
Functional runs with head motion greater than 1˚ or 1 mm of rotation or 
translation, respectively, were removed from further analyses.  This resulted in the 
removal of nine (out of 99) functional runs for the pay-today task, and eight (out of 99) 
functional runs for the accept-today task.   
3.3 Behavioral Data Analysis  
Participant responses to the pre-scan survey questions as well as their responses in 
the scanner were collected using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 20 software.  This 
software was then used to carry out the statistical analyses done with the data, which 
included a factor analysis to determine both our time and magnitude clusters.  By making 
use of factor analysis and collapsing across reward amounts, we were able to find the 
delays that naturally clustered together based upon how participants responded to the 
questions rather than by our own intuition.  This meant that from one clustered group of 
delays to another, there were observable differences in participant responses regarding 
how much money they would be willing to accept in the future or pay today.  The delay 
clusters found were (days to months); (1, 2, and 5 years); and (10 or 20 years).  We 
labeled these clusters as short, medium, and long respectively.  An almost identical 
procedure was used to find the monetary rewards that group together based upon 
responses regardless of the delay period.  Three clusters were found for monetary rewards 
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which were ($5), ($500 to $5,000), and ($500,000).  These clusters of rewards were 
labeled as small, medium, and large.      
3.4 Functional Imaging Data Analysis 
Data were analyzed using a random-effects model, implemented with a two-level 
procedure.  Following preprocessing, single-subject fMRI data were modeled in a general 
linear model (GLM) by a design-matrix comprised of onsets and durations for each event 
for each functional run of the pay-today and accept-today tasks.  A total of nine 
predictors were defined, based on the results of a factor analysis (see Table 1); each 
predictor was convolved with a two-gamma hemodynamic response function (HRF); 
(Boynton et al., 1996).  An uncorrected p-value of 0.001 was first used, followed by 
cluster-level statistical thresholding to p = 0.05 to control for multiple comparisons.  This 
cluster thresholding approach (Forman et al., 1995) is recommended as a method to 
reduce false positives, increase localization, and aide in the accurate interpretation of 
fMRI results (Woo et al., 2014).  
4. Results 
4.1 Behavioral Results 
The delay discounting questions that were presented to participants in the scanner 
were identical to those they saw in the pre-scan questionnaire.  Having participants 
respond twice to these questions gave us the opportunity to assess whether any 
irregularities would result from a change in environment.  Upon comparing participant 
answers in SPSS, no significant changes were found in responses between the pre-scan 
and in-scan questions.  
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Table 1. The nine different predictors found from our fMRI data using factor analysis   
Reward Delay Predictors 
$50 (Small) Short (Days to Months) SmallShort 
$50 (Small) Intermediate (1,2,5 years) SmallIntermediate 
$50 (Small) Long (10 to 20 years) SmallLong 
$500 to $5000 (Medium) Short (Days to Months) MediumShort 
$500 to $5000 (Medium) Intermediate (1,2,5 years) MediumIntermediate 
$500 to $5000 (Medium) Long (10 to 20 years) MediumLong 
$500,000 (Large) Short (Days to Months) LargeShort 
$500,000 (Large) Intermediate (1,2,5 years) LargeIntermediate 
$500,000 (Large) Long (10 to 20 years) LargeLong 
 
4.2 Neuroimaging Results 
The purpose of our neuroimaging data was to look at brain activity differences 
that occur when participants make intertemporal choices under different time frames and 
with varying reward values.  All fMRI scans were analyzed using Brain Voyager 
software.  To investigate brain activation, the questions that statistically clustered 
together based upon the delay period were used to make contrasts in Brain Voyager that 
compared brain activity occurring during answers to short questions vs long questions, 
short vs intermediate, and intermediate vs long.  As an example of these contrasts, the 
long vs short grouping would display areas of the brain that were active across all 
participants whenever they were presented with a question when the delay was long (10 
to 20 years) compared to when the delay was short (days to months).  Also, this contrast 
displays areas of the brain more active when the delay is short compared to when the 
delay is long, but uses a different identifier (color, negative value).  Significant areas of 
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activation found in these contrasts are displayed in Table 2 and Figure 4.  In the long vs 
short delay contrast, activation was seen in the fusiform gyrus, culmen, medial frontal 
gyrus, precentral gyrus, insula, and superior temporal gyrus during answers to long delay 
questions, while activity in the cuneus was observed during short delay questions.  The 
intermediate vs short delay contrast showed activity in the middle occipital gyrus, 
culmen, medial frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus, insula, and inferior occipital gyrus during 
intermediate periods, while short delay questions only showed cuneus activation.  A 
contrast was also attempted for the long vs intermediate time periods; however, no 
significant differences in activation were found between these delays.   
In a similar fashion, activation contrasts were also created for varying reward 
magnitudes.  These contrasts included the pairings large vs small, medium vs small, and 
large vs medium reward values (corresponding to the statistical groupings determined 
previously).  The large vs small contrast showed activation in the precuneus, middle 
frontal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus in response to large rewards.  
Small rewards caused activation in the inferior parietal lobule, precentral gyrus, and 
inferior parietal lobule.  The medium vs small contrast displayed medium sized rewards 
eliciting activation in the cuneus and middle frontal gyrus, whereas small rewards 
resulted in activation in the inferior parietal lobule, postcentral gyrus, and insula.  The 
last contrast created between reward values was large vs medium, and it showed 
activation in the angular gyrus when large reward questions were asked.  These results 
are summarized in Table 3 and Figure 5. 
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Table 2. Brain contrasts created for differing delay periods. Positive t-values are more 
active during + conditions. Negative t-values were more active during – conditions. Note. 
Abbreviations R = Right; L = left; BA = Brodmann area; NOV = number of voxels. Peak 
voxel, Brodmann area, and Talairach coordinates are for the peak voxel. All activation 
sites reached p < .001 after cluster thresholding corrections. One voxel is equal to 3 mm3.  
N = 25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peak Voxel Side BA 
Talairach Coordinate 
NOV t 
x y z 
Long+ Short- 
Cuneus R 17 3 -82 13 10210 -4.977944 
Fusiform Gyrus R 19 42 -67 -5 4877 6.339715 
Culmen R - 15 -46 -17 6599 8.782126 
Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
L 6 -6 -13 55 1994 5.087734 
Precentral Gyrus L 4 -30 -28 52 12510 6.900496 
Insula L 13 -42 -4 13 2423 5.833056 
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
L 41 -42 -34 16 2952 4.729481 
 
Peak Voxel Side BA 
Talairach Coordinate 
NOV t 
x y z 
Intermediate+ Short- 
Cuneus R 17 3 -79 10 3948 -4.944561 
Middle Occipital 
Gyrus 
R 37 49 -64 -8 8781 8.169078 
Culmen R - 12 -49 -17 10071 7.213074 
Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
L 6 -3 -10 52 3207 6.141321 
Precentral Gyrus L 4 -30 -25 49 16885 7.928279 
Insula L 13 -42 -7 13 1437 5.544353 
Inferior Occipital 
Gyrus 
L 18 -45 -79 -8 2052 5.74411 
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Table 3. Brain contrasts created for differing reward magnitudes. Positive t-values are 
more active during + conditions. Negative t-values were more active during – conditions. 
Note. Abbreviations R = Right; L = left; BA = Brodmann area; NOV = number of voxels. 
Peak voxel, Brodmann area, and Talairach coordinates are for the peak voxel. All 
activation sites reached p < .001 after cluster thresholding corrections. One voxel is equal 
to 3 mm3.  N = 25. 
 
 
 
 
Peak Voxel Side BA 
Talairach Coordinate 
NOV t 
x y z 
Medium+ Small- 
Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
R 40 54 -28 25 2350 -4.968945 
Postcentral 
Gyrus 
L 3 -43 -25 61 2328 -4.989397 
Insula L 13 -45 -7 13 2755 -6.183497 
Postcentral 
Gyrus 
L 40 -51 -25 22 7996 -6.08046 
Cuneus L 18 -24 -91 -2 69011 9.050596 
Middle Frontal 
Gyrus 
R 6 27 -7 49 1364 5.579226 
 
Peak Voxel Side BA 
Talairach Coordinate 
NOV t 
x y z 
Large+ Small- 
Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
R 40 51 -28 25 1485 -4.456243 
Precentral Gyrus L 6 -48 -4 10 2508 -5.742199 
Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
L 40 -66 -31 29 7073 -6.400276 
Precuneus L 7 -24 -67 28 104500 10.28237 
Middle Frontal 
Gyrus 
R 6 27 -4 52 3631 6.607982 
Cingulate Gyrus L 32 -6 14 43 2362 5.784618 
Middle Frontal 
Gyrus 
L 9 -42 14 31 1728 5.4002 
 
Peak Voxel Side BA 
Talairach Coordinate 
NOV t 
x y z 
Large+ Medium- 
Angular Gyrus R 39 48 -61 34 2382 5.089946 
Angular Gyrus L 39 -39 -55 34 717 4.511892 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
With these contrasts created for both varying rewards and delays, we can address 
our earlier hypotheses.  First, using both the reward and delay contrasts, we must 
determine if some of the activation we observe matches areas of the brain commonly 
thought to be involved when making intertemporal choices.  This will help us to validate 
that even with novel stimuli, we are still seeing similar network activity as previous 
studies.  Next, we will switch our focus to the contrasts looking at changes in the delay 
period.  In these contrasts, we will be looking for activation that either supports or 
opposes our novel tri-phasic delay discounting hypothesis.  Last, the contrasts made on 
the basis of differing monetary rewards will be used to evaluate if different neural 
activation is elicited by changes in reward value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. a) Long(o) Short(b) Crosshairs on medial frontal gyrus activation.  b) Large(o) 
Small(b) Crosshairs on middle frontal gyrus activation (c) Long(o) Short(b) Crosshairs 
on insular activation d) Medium(o) Short(b) Crosshairs on insular activation Note: o – 
orange b – blue    
 
a) 
c) 
b) 
d) 
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To examine differences between LL and SS choices, we contrasted both medium 
and large rewards to small rewards.  In addition, we also contrasted both intermediate and 
long delays to short delays.  Similar to previous studies, we observed dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex activation for longer delays and larger rewards.  This activation is seen 
in the middle frontal gyrus for larger rewards and the medial frontal gyrus for longer 
delays (See Figure 4).  This activity, while in different regions depending on the variable, 
further supports the role of prefrontal regions in the brain being responsible for delaying 
gratification.  Additionally, insular activation was found in the long and intermediate 
delay periods that were contrasted with short delays.  Insular regions are considered to be 
important components of the decision making network as they integrate sensation to 
emotional states, which eventually leads to action selection (Craig, 2002).  Previous 
models have hypothesized that different parts of the insula are activated in short-term and 
long-term reward prediction (Tanaka et al., 2016).  Supporting this finding, insular 
activation was also found in our study when participants were making small reward 
decisions vs large ones.  Other delay discounting studies have observed ventral medial 
prefrontal activation in response to choosing SS rewards; however, no significant 
activation in this region was observed in our contrasts.  The lack of this activity could be 
a result of slight variations in our delay discounting task compared to other studies or 
could be caused by participants not receiving immediate reinforcing stimuli while making 
these decisions.  Instead, participants only obtained compensation at the completion of 
the study.  Research has been conducted to evaluate if hypothetical delay discounting 
tasks generate different results from the real world and their findings suggest that only 
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slight (Lane et al., 2003) differences are detectable, if any (Madden et al., 2003; Madden 
et al., 2004).  While this factor may have a slight impact on brain activation in delay 
discounting tasks, the present study would be unable to be conducted without using a 
slightly hypothetical framework.  Also, our study can be compared with other works that 
have similarly found little activation for SS choices in hypothetical discounting tasks 
(Wittmann et al., 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. a) Long(o) Short(b) Crosshairs on medial frontal gyrus activation.  b) 
Intermediate(o) Short(b) Crosshairs on medial frontal gyrus activation (c) Long(o) 
Short(b) Crosshairs on insular activation d) Medium(o) Short(b) Crosshairs on insular 
activation Note: o – orange b – blue    
 
Taking a closer look at our contrasts involving different delays, we observe 
common activation for the long and intermediate delay periods in the medial frontal 
gyrus of the left hemisphere (See Figure 5).  This area stands out as significant due to 
reports of the medial frontal gyrus being involved with delayed choices (MacKillop et al., 
2012). This finding, common to both long and intermediate delay periods, suggests that 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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the medial frontal gyrus is involved in some way in delaying gratification.  A different 
area of the prefrontal cortex is active in our contrasts involving changing reward 
magnitudes; therefore, this region may also be specific to differentiating between 
immediate and long-term delays (See Figures 5 and 6).  Insular activation is also 
observed in both the intermediate and long delay periods (See Figure 5).  As mentioned 
previously, the insula is often associated to play a part in delaying gratification and 
seeing that area active in both of the longer delay periods supports this fact.  Common to 
both of the longer delays was activation in the culmen and precentral gyrus.  It is possible 
that these areas are a part of the neuronal circuit that differentiates between delay periods 
when it comes to making intertemporal choices, but it is difficult to make any concrete 
conclusions here with a lack of previous research.  These areas are just as likely to be 
active as a result of visual, auditory, or motor stimuli involved with the task.  The neural 
congruence in activation observed during both the intermediate and long delay periods 
suggests that our tri-phasic hypothesis of brain activation is likely incorrect.  While there 
are slight differences in activation between the two time periods in the occipital gyrus, 
temporal gyrus, and fusiform gyrus, these are areas that lack convincing evidence when it 
comes to playing a part in intertemporal choices.  Activation in separate areas of the 
prefrontal cortex or orbitofrontal cortex would be more likely if a different mechanism 
was involved in differentiating between intermediate and long time periods.  The cuneus 
is the only area of activation observed for immediate rewards.  The areas of the cuneus 
that were shown to be active lead us to believe that this activation is a result of stimulus 
saliency.  This activation could mean that rewards in the short-term stand out to 
participants.  
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Figure 6. a) Medium(o) Small(b) Crosshairs on middle frontal gyrus activation.  b) 
Large(o) Small(b) Crosshairs on cingulate gyrus activation (c) Large(o) Small(b) 
Crosshairs on right middle frontal gyrus activation d) Large(o) Medium(b) Two clusters 
seen are left and right angular gyrus activation Note: o – orange b – blue    
 
The middle frontal gyrus was a common area of activation for both medium and 
large rewards and increasing the magnitude of the reward also increased activation in this 
region (See Figure 6).  With prefrontal regions being commonly found in delay 
discounting studies, this area likely plays a key role in choosing larger rewards.  Specific 
middle frontal gyrus activation has also been seen in similar discounting studies dealing 
with monetary rewards (Xu et al., 2009).  During presentation of medium rewards, only 
the left middle frontal gyrus was active (See Figure 6).  When the magnitude of the 
reward grew, this activation also included the recruitment of the right middle frontal 
gyrus.  Bilateral recruitment has been discussed as a way for the prefrontal cortex to cope 
with more cognitive challenges (Höller-Wallscheid et al., 2017).  It would make sense 
that a larger monetary reward would be perceived by the brain to be a more difficult 
a) b) 
c) 
 
d) 
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decision and result in the bilateral activation observed as the value of the reward 
increases.  Large reward magnitudes also elicited activation in the cingulate gyrus.  As 
hypothesized from previous studies, the cingulate gyrus has shown its influence when 
choosing larger rewards no matter the time period (Wittmann et al., 2007).  With the 
absence of cingulate gyrus activation when varying the delay period, these results support 
the assumption that the cingulate gyrus is involved in decisions and expectancies for 
larger rewards across all time periods.  Precuneus and cuneus activation was seen for 
larger reward values and the area of activation in this region increased with increasing 
reward value.  While these results may seem contradictory to our assumption of stimulus 
saliency made in response to cuneus activation during short delay periods, the way our 
contrasts are created would still support this theory.  As an immediate reward may draw 
more attention to itself, so might a reward that is higher in magnitude, thus eliciting such 
a large group of activation that increased with reward value.  The direct contrast between 
intermediate and large reward values showed only bilateral activation of the angular 
gyrus (See Figure 6).  Neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that the angular 
gyrus is commonly active when individuals are making mathematical calculations.  With 
the rewards of our study being monetary in nature and the difference in value between 
large and medium rewards being upwards of 495,000, angular gyrus activity is likely a 
result of increased mental math when participants answer questions involving large 
rewards.    
Still looking at our contrasts involving differing reward value, but switching gears 
to look at the smaller rewards, common activation is seen in the inferior parietal lobule 
(See Figure 7).  The inferior parietal lobule has been reported to take part in executive 
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function, inhibitory control, (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2010) and has been found active when 
subjects make more difficult delay discounting choices (McClure et al., 2004; 
Monterosso et al., 2007).  Our findings do not seem to fit well with these conclusions; 
however, the inferior parietal lobule is also involved in the attention network (Ptak, 
2012).  Decisions in the short term may make individuals feel like they must be more 
attentive, which may explain the observed activation in this region.  Precentral and 
postcentral gyrus activation was also found for small rewards values.  Further research 
that specifically looks at how the magnitude of a reward may alter brain activation is 
required to say anything conclusive in regard to these areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. a) Large(o) Small(b) Two activation clusters represent bilateral activation of 
the inferior parietal lobule.  b) Medium(o) Small(b) Crosshairs on right inferior parietal 
lobule activation Note: o – orange b – blue    
 
To expand this study, future research could look at how brain activation patterns 
may change for individuals considered to be impulsive.  Impulsive individuals have been 
observed to have altered brain activity when it comes to making intertemporal choices 
(Stoeckel et al., 2013).  These changes are often observed as insufficient functioning of 
executive control regions such as the prefrontal cortex.  If clear evidence was found that 
one such brain region elicited significantly different activation only seen in impulsive 
participants, fMRI could be used to determine one’s propensity to forming addictions.  
a) b) 
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In summary, this article aimed to clarify the differences in brain activation that 
may result from participant perceptions of a delay period or reward value.  Additionally, 
we proposed that a tri-phasic delay discounting hypothesis would better explain 
behavioral responses to typical delay discounting questions involving exceedingly long 
delays, and that these excessive delays would call on separate neuronal networks.  Our 
findings did not provide any evidence to support this tri-phasic hypothesis.  When the 
delay to a reward was increased, common activation in the medial frontal gyrus, 
precentral gyrus, and insula was found.  Varying the value of a reward did result in slight 
variations in brain activation, with the cingulate gyrus notably being active when 
choosing the largest of rewards.  Additionally, the middle frontal gyrus increased in 
activation and even displayed bilateral recruitment with increasing reward value.  
Showing that similar networks in the brain seem to be responsible for all delays, even 
those into the far future, may aid researchers in determining the best function to properly 
model behavioral responses to intertemporal choices.  Moreover, when these results are 
combined, they provide strong evidence that the value and delay of a reward are handled 
by dissociable neural networks when making intertemporal choices.  
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